The National Stolen Property Act and the Return of Stolen Cultural Property to its Rightful Foreign Owners by Morrow, Jessica Eve
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 1 Sharpening the Cutting Edge of International
Human Rights Law: Unresolved Issues of War Crimes
Tribunals
Article 15
12-1-2007
The National Stolen Property Act and the Return
of Stolen Cultural Property to its Rightful Foreign
Owners
Jessica Eve Morrow
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jessica Eve Morrow, The National Stolen Property Act and the Return of Stolen Cultural Property to its
Rightful Foreign Owners , 30 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. (2007), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
iclr/vol30/iss1/15
THE NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT 
AND THE RETURN OF STOLEN CULTURAL 
PROPERTY TO ITS RIGHTFUL  
FOREIGN OWNERS 
Jessica Eve Morrow*
Abstract: Artifact-rich countries have recently begun to campaign more 
vigorously for the return of their cultural property that has found its way 
illegally into the United States. Whether blatantly stolen or taken in viola-
tion of a country’s export law, the National Stolen Property Act is the ve-
hicle through which these countries can hope to retrieve their property. 
Its requirements, however, have often proven too difªcult for countries to 
overcome. The United States, on behalf of the source country, must meet 
the mens rea requirement of the National Stolen Property Act, an often in-
surmountable goal because of the confusion surrounding the circum-
stances under which the property was taken. By relaxing the mens rea re-
quirement, the National Stolen Property Act will become more effective 
and its goals of punishment and deterrence will be furthered. 
Introduction 
 The issue of protecting cultural property has emerged in recent 
years as one of critical importance to countries that are mostly develop-
ing but are rich in artifacts that attract the eye of collectors and mu-
seum-goers the world over.1 The illegal importation of cultural prop-
erty into the United States from such countries is a billion-dollar 
industry that puts a strain on the relationship between the United 
States and source countries.2 In response to this issue, the United States 
has developed a series of progressive cultural property laws, such as the 
National Stolen Property Act of 1961 (NSPA), that allow source coun-
                                                                                                                      
* Jessica Morrow is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Kevin F. Jowers, International and National Legal Efforts to Protect Cultural Property: The 
1970 UNESCO Convention, the United States, and Mexico, 38 Tex. Int’l L. J. 145, 146 (2003). 
2 James E. Sherry, U.S. Legal Mechanisms for the Repatriation of Cultural Property: Evaluat-
ing Strategies for the Successful Recovery of Claimed National Patrimony, 37 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 511, 511 (2005). 
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tries to retrieve stolen cultural property from the United States.3 This 
Note argues that by relaxing the NSPA requirement that the defendant 
knows that he or she is importing an artifact which has been stolen 
from the source country, these laws will be more effective in ªghting 
the illegal importation of stolen cultural property.4 Relaxation of the 
mens rea requirement would not result in a loss of legally imported arti-
facts because the United States, on behalf of the source country, would 
still be required to establish a prima facie case against the defendant 
before it could beneªt from the lessened evidentiary burden.5
 This Note’s Background section discusses the importance of pro-
tecting cultural property. The Discussion section examines the legal 
safeguards that the United States has developed, such as the NSPA and 
the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA).6 
These laws were enacted to stem the ºow of stolen cultural property 
into this country, and to provide a forum for foreign countries to re-
trieve that property once it has entered into the United States.7
 The Analysis section proposes modiªcations to the NSPA that 
would make it easier for foreign countries to recover artifacts that have 
been stolen from within their borders and brought to the United 
States. This solution balances the source country’s right to recovery of 
stolen cultural property on the one hand, with the rights of private 
owners to retain lawfully acquired and imported artifacts, on the other. 
I. Background 
 The term “cultural property” refers to objects that have “artistic, 
archaeological, ethnological or historical interest” and value.8 Cultural 
property is often found in “source” nations, such as many Central and 
South American countries, Egypt, Greece, and Cambodia, that are usu-
ally developing and rich in artifacts, but without the resources or infra-
structure to protect those artifacts from looters or to properly care for 
them in national museums.9 “Market” nations, on the other hand, are 
                                                                                                                      
3 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2001). 
4 See Laura M. Siegle, United States v. Schultz: Putting Cultural Property in its Place, 18 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 453, 456 (2004). 
5 See id. at 463. 
6 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 
(2005); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315. 
7 See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 
(2005); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315. 
8 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 Am. J. Int’l. 
L. 831, 831 (1986). 
9 See Jowers, supra note 1, at 147; Siegle, supra note 4, at 455. 
2007] National Stolen Property Act 251 
Western, developed states, such as the United States and Great Britain, 
where a great many objects of cultural property are brought, and even-
tually wind up in museums, private collections, or packed away in 
crates.10
A. Why Protecting Cultural Property Is Important 
 Protecting cultural property at the original site from looting is vital 
for anthropologists, historians, and others who care about preserving 
cultural heritage.11 Looting results in the disappearance of an artifact 
into the miasma of the world of illegally exported and imported arti-
facts, and destroys any record of the context, history, and cultural af-
ªliation of the object.12
 Not only is protecting cultural property important for archeologi-
cal and scientiªc communities, but it is also vital to a nation’s collective 
cultural identity.13 The theory of cultural nationalism suggests that cul-
tural property should be protected because it links present inhabitants 
to their national heritage through identiªcation with the location 
where the cultural property was found.14 This theory gives nations a 
singular interest in the speciªc object found, suggests the attribution of 
a national character to that artifact, and advocates that the item is thus 
best appreciated within the context of its place of origin.15 Another 
theory, cultural internationalism, suggests that cultural property is a 
part of a common human culture, whatever its place of origin.16 Ac-
cording to this theory, an artifact is best appreciated by being exhibited 
in a place easily accessible to the public, such as a museum in a large 
international city which is likely to be more accessible to the wider pub-
lic than the place of the artifact’s origin.17 These two theories underlie 
the proliferation of laws aimed at curbing the illegal export and import 
of cultural property.18 Market nations have recognized that, in order to 
foster good international relations and protect stolen cultural property 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Jowers, supra note 1, at 147. 
11 See Kavita Sharma, From the Mayan Machaquila Stele to Egyptian Pharaoh Amenhotep’s 
Head: United States Courts’ Enforcement of Foreign National Patrimony Laws After United States v. 
Schultz, 56 Hastings L.J. 749, 750 (2005). 
12 See id. 
13 Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions on Cultural 
Property & Destructive Aspects of Retention Schemes, 26 Hous. J. Int’l L. 449, 454 (2004). 
14 Id. 
15 Merryman, supra note 8, at 832. 
16 Id. at 831. 
17 See Siegle, supra note 4, at 454. 
18 See id. at 455. 
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from being lost in the black market, they must enact laws that allow 
foreign countries to seek the return of their cultural property.19 Cul-
tural nationalism informs this Note’s argument that in order to effectu-
ate the proper goals of the NSPA—punishment and repatriation—the 
burdens of proof for source nations must be relaxed.20
B. National Patrimony Laws 
 The difference between a stolen object of cultural property, and 
one that is illicitly exported is that for an object to be considered sto-
len, it must have an owner, while an illegally exported object is merely 
one that has been taken out of the source country in violation of that 
nation’s export laws.21
 Most source countries have national patrimony laws that vest 
ownership of all cultural property, whether known or unknown or 
above or below ground, in the state.22 Thus, after the enactment of a 
national patrimony law, private owners cannot acquire title to such 
property; if any such property is found after the passage of the law it 
automatically becomes property of the state and must be turned over 
to the government.23 This makes the source country the owner of all 
cultural property within it borders.24 Source countries can also enact 
national export laws that restrict the export of cultural objects except 
under limited circumstances.25 Thus, an illicit export occurs when an 
object is taken out of the source country without a permit, if one is 
required.26
                                                                                                                      
19 See id. 
20 See Sherry, supra note 2, at 532-33. 
21 U.S. State Dep’t, Bureau of Educ. and Dep’t Affairs, Int’l Cultural Property Protection, 
http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/faqs.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. 
State Dep’t]. 
22 John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation Movement 
Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 51–52 (2004). 
23 See id. at 67. 
24 U.S. State Dep’t, supra note 21. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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II. Discussion 
A. 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and  
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of  
Ownership on Cultural property 
 The 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientiªc, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership 
on Cultural Property (UNESCO Convention) is a multi-national 
agreement that attempts to unify international cultural property law.27 
The long-term purpose of the convention is to protect the knowledge 
that can be gathered from excavated archaeological material and “to 
preserve ethnographic material that remains in its societal context” in 
the source country.28 UNESCO Convention deªnes “cultural prop-
erty” broadly and places restrictions on imports, exports, and transfer 
of title of cultural property.29 In particular, Article 9 states: 
 The States Parties to this Convention undertake, in these 
circumstances, to participate in a concerted international ef-
fort to determine and to carry out the necessary concrete 
measures, including the control of exports and imports and 
international commerce in the speciªc materials concerned. 
Pending agreement each State concerned shall take provi-
sional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable 
injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State.30
Thus, parties to the UNESCO Convention agree to: 
(1) prevent the transfer of ownership and illicit movement of 
cultural property; (2) insure the earliest possible restitution of 
property to rightful owners; (3) admit actions for recovery of 
cultural property brought by or on behalf of aggrieved parties; 
and (4) recognize the indefeasible right of each state to de-
                                                                                                                      
27 United Nations Educational, Scientiªc and Cultural Organization, Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Owner-
ship of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Convention]; 
Joshua E. Kastenberg, Assessing the Evolution and Available Actions for Recovery in Cultural 
Property Cases, 6 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L., 39, 48–49 (1995). 
28 U.S. State Dep’t, supra note 21, http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/backgrnd1.html 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
29 Cohan, supra note 22, at 43. 
30 Convention, supra note 27, at art. 9. 
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clare certain cultural property inalienable and not susceptible 
to exportation.31
B. The Cultural Property Implementation Act 
 The United States became a signatory to the UNESCO Convention 
in 1982, when Congress ratiªed the convention through the Cultural 
Property Implementation Act (CPIA).32 This Act codiªed UNESCO 
Convention into United States law and allowed the government to im-
plement Article 9 and provide foreign plaintiffs with a cause of action 
in the United States.33 The Act allows the United States to recognize 
demands from countries for the United States to place import restric-
tions on archaeological artifacts that have been looted from within 
their boundaries.34 The recognition of these requests promotes licit 
and documented trade and reduces the incentive for pillage, thus pro-
tecting valuable archaeological and cultural material that resides in 
situ.35 Under Section 308 of the CPIA, no article of stolen cultural 
property from a party to the UNESCO Convention may be imported 
into the United States after the date the convention entered into force 
with respect to that party, or the effective date of the CPIA (April 12, 
1983), whichever is later.36 Violations of the CPIA result in seizure, for-
feiture, and return of the cultural property to the rightful country 
owner.37 Under the CPIA, the United States has signed numerous bilat-
eral agreements with foreign countries aimed at reducing the number 
of illegally exported works that enter the United States by enforcing the 
source country’s cultural property laws.38
C. The National Stolen Property Act 
 The UNESCO Convention is also enforceable in the United States 
under the NSPA.39 While the CPIA provides for civil remedies, the 
                                                                                                                      
31 Cohan, supra note 22, at 43–44. 
32 Kastenberg, supra note 27, at 49. 
33 Id. 
34 Cohan, supra note 22, at 46. 
35 U.S. State Dep’t, supra note 21, http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/backgrnd.html 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
36 U.S State Department, supra note 21, http://exchanges.state.gov.culprop/backgrnd2. 
html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
37 Cunning, supra note 13, at 472. 
38 Daniel W. Eck & Patty Gerstenblith, International Cultural Property, 37 Int’l L. 565, 
566 (2003). 
39 Kastenberg, supra note 27, at 50. 
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NSPA creates an enforcement arm of the CPIA by taking source coun-
tries’ patrimony laws into consideration and making criminal sanctions 
available.40 The NSPA, which was enacted in 1948, states that 
“[w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign 
commerce any goods . . . of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the 
same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud . . . [s]hall be 
ªned under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both.”41 Additionally, “[w]hoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, 
barters, sells, or disposes of any goods . . . which have crossed a State or 
United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or 
taken, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or 
taken” is subject to ªne or imprisonment.42 United States courts have 
read the NSPA to provide for the enforcement of all international cul-
tural property controls, including the UNESCO Convention, and to 
allow the United States to represent the interests of foreign countries 
by suing individuals for recovery of cultural property that has been sto-
len or illegally imported into the United States.43
 Under the NSPA, United States courts evaluate whether a source 
country’s national patrimony law sufªciently vests ownership in the 
artifact, such that it could be considered “stolen,” and therefore form 
the basis of a cognizable claim within the courts’ jurisdiction.44 The 
NSPA has been interpreted to apply to cases involving a defendant 
who sells or receives property that he or she knows has been illegally 
excavated in violation of a foreign country’s export laws.45 Thus, prov-
ing that the defendant had knowledge of the source country’s na-
tional patrimony law is a requirement for successful prosecution un-
der the NSPA.46 Because of the often ambiguous circumstances 
surrounding the excavation and provenance of an object, this eviden-
tiary burden of the NSPA often proves to be a barrier to source coun-
tries seeking the return of their property.47
                                                                                                                      
40 Id.; Sharma, supra note 11, at 756. 
41 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2001). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2001). 
43 Kastenberg, supra note 27, at 50. 
44 Sharma, supra note 11, at 756. 
45 Cohan, supra note 22, at 65. 
46 See id. 
47 See Sherry, supra note 2, at 532–33 (explaining concept through a hypothetical). 
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D. The Development of the Knowledge Requirement of the NSPA 
1. The First Consideration of National Patrimony Laws:  
United States v. Hollinshead 
 The ªrst case in which United States courts considered national 
patrimony laws under the NSPA was United States v. Hollinshead in 
1974.48 The defendants, including a dealer in pre-Columbian arti-
facts, organized the removal and transport into the United States of a 
rare pre-Columbian stele that was found in a Mayan ruin in the Gua-
temalan jungle.49 The defendants were convicted under the NSPA for 
conspiracy to transport stolen property in interstate commerce.50 In 
upholding the conviction, the Ninth Circuit credited expert testimony 
that the stele and other such artifacts were property of the state under 
Guatemalan law, and therefore could not be removed without gov-
ernmental permission.51 The court also found that there was “over-
whelming evidence” that the defendants knew it was a violation of 
Guatemalan law to remove the stele and that they knew it was stolen.52 
This case, however, presented a rare situation in which the stolen arti-
fact was extensively documented by the source country, and therefore 
easily proven to be that country’s property without the need for the 
United States court to analyze the applicable national patrimony 
law.53
2. Elements Necessary for a Conviction under the NSPA:  
United States v. McClain 
 In 1977, in United States v. McClain, the Fifth Circuit held that in 
order for the defendants to be convicted under the NSPA for stealing 
pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico and selling them in the United 
States, the prosecution had to show that the defendants either knew 
that the items were stolen or that possessing or removing the objects 
violated Mexican law, and that the artifacts were owned by the Mexi-
can government at the time they were removed.54 At trial, evidence, 
                                                                                                                      
48 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Sharma, supra note 11, at 757. 
49 Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1155–56. 
52 Id. at 1155. 
53 Sharma, supra note 11, at 757–58. 
54 United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 660–63 (5th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter McClain 
II]; Sharma, supra note 11, at 759. 
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such as forged documents regarding the artifacts history, was intro-
duced to show that the defendants knew their actions were illegal.55 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld Mexico’s national patrimony law 
by ªnding that the NSPA applied to ownership by foreign legislative 
declarations even if the objects in question had never been physically 
possessed by that government.56
 When the case was appealed a second time, the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether Mexico’s patrimony laws were adequately 
clear in giving title to the Mexican government.57 While the court 
agreed with the defendants that the various Mexican patrimony laws 
were “vague and inaccessible except to a handful of experts who work 
for the Mexican government,” the court found that the most recent 
patrimony law was “clear and unequivocal in claiming ownership of all 
artifacts.”58 The Court thus upheld the conspiracy conviction under the 
NSPA because the evidence showed that the defendants knew the arti-
facts were stolen.59 The defendants knew about the most recent patri-
mony law, attempted to conceal their actions and falsiªed the origin of 
the artifacts.60 McClain II thus exhibits the readiness of United States 
courts to uphold convictions under the NSPA for transporting stolen 
artifacts into the United States, but only if the applicable national pat-
rimony law is clear and unambiguous and the defendants knew that the 
artifact was stolen.61
3. The Future of NSPA Litigation: United States v. Schultz 
 In United States v. Schultz, the Second Circuit stated that the NSPA 
should be broadly construed to justify the federal courts’ application 
of the statute whenever they determine that the property was stolen in 
another country.62 Schultz, a prominent New York art dealer, was con-
victed under the NSPA of smuggling Egyptian artifacts out of Egypt 
and selling them in the United States in violation of Egypt’s cultural 
patrimony law.63 The defendant and his co-conspirator produced false 
                                                                                                                      
55 McClain II, 593 F.2d at 660–63. 
56 United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter McClain I]. 
57 Sharma, supra note 11, at 759. 
58 McClain II, 593 F.2d at 664, 670–71. 
59 Id. at 671. 
60 Id. at 660–63. 
61 Sharma, supra note 11, at 759–60. 
62 333 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2003). 
63 Id. at 395–98. 
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labels regarding the provenance of the objects, and created a fake art 
collection through which to sell the objects in the United States.64
 The Second Circuit held that an object is “stolen” under the 
NSPA if it has been taken from a country in violation of that country’s 
patrimony law.65 The Court then stated that the Egyptian national 
patrimony law was sufªciently clear in establishing Egyptian owner-
ship of all artifacts found after 1983, the year that the national patri-
mony law was enacted.66
 The conviction in Schultz signals the United States’ commitment 
to enforce the cultural patrimony laws of foreign countries, and to 
represent the interests of those countries in criminal actions in 
United States courts.67 Because of the difªculties that source coun-
tries face in proving that the defendant knew that the artifact was sto-
len and that their actions violated the source country’s national pat-
rimony laws, however, the NSPA still does not provide foreign 
countries with complete relief in their quest to halt the disappearance 
of their cultural heritage.68
III. Analysis 
 In order to be convicted under the NSPA, a defendant must have 
stolen or imported the object knowing that he was doing so in violation 
of a country’s patrimony laws.69 The heavy evidentiary burden that 
source countries face begs the question of whether the goal of the 
NSPA is to return stolen cultural property, or merely to punish offend-
ers.70 Were the knowledge burden relaxed, the NSPA would better ef-
fectuate both goals—offenders would be more easily convicted and the 
stolen object would be more likely to be returned.71
 A relaxation of the mens rea requirement of the NSPA would not 
result in the United States’ losing artifacts that have been imported 
into the country legally.72 Because the foreign country would ªrst be 
required to establish a prima facie case against the defendant before 
                                                                                                                      
64 Id. at 396. 
65 Id. at 399, 404; Siegle, supra note 4, at 461. 
66 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 399, 402. 
67 See Siegle, supra note 4, at 455. 
68 See id. at 464. 
69 See Mark J. Petr, Trading Places: Illicit Antiquities, Foreign Cultural Patrimony Laws, and the 
U.S. National Stolen Property Act after United States v. Schultz, 28 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 503, 506 (2005); Siegle, supra note 4, at 463. 
70 See Siegle, supra note 4, at 464. 
71 See Sherry, supra note 2, at 534. 
72 See Siegle, supra note 4, at 463. 
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it can beneªt from the presumption attendant to a national patri-
mony law crafted with regard to the guidelines of the NSPA, the exis-
tence of a well-crafted patrimony law alone does not mean that the 
artifact will be returned to the claiming country.73
 While a court will impute knowledge to the defendant based on 
the circumstances, it remains extremely difªcult to prove that the de-
fendant had sufªcient knowledge of a foreign country’s patrimony 
laws.74 A country must also prove that the artifact was stolen, meaning 
that the artifact must have been documented by the source country 
prior to its theft.75 This is often impossible, however, because many arti-
facts remain buried below ground, unknown to the government until 
they are dug up by a looter and shipped out of the country.76 Because 
the problem of documenting every artifact presents many of its own 
concerns that are better suited to discussion in a more in-depth forum, 
this Note focuses only on the NSPA’s knowledge requirement.77
 While in Schultz the elaborate deceptions the defendants engaged 
in, such as creating a fake collection and forging certiªcates, made it 
obvious that they knew they were violating Egyptian cultural patri-
mony law, in many cases a defendant would have bought something 
that he or she does not know has been illegally exported, or will take 
an artifact without knowing that the source county has declared own-
ership through a national patrimony law.78
 In situations such as these, a source country seeking the return of 
its stolen cultural property faces the difªcult task of proving that the 
defendant both knew of and understood that country’s cultural pat-
rimony law, and knew that his actions would result in the theft of the 
artifact under that law.79 National cultural patrimony laws, however, 
are often inaccessible to any but the most informed, and might be 
written in a way that only experts can understand.80 In fact, United 
States courts have sometimes found that the governing national cul-
                                                                                                                      
73 See Sharma, supra note 11, at 766–67. 
74 See Ildiko Pogany DeAngelis, How Much Provenance is Enough? Post-Schultz Guidelines 
for Art Museum Acquisition of Archaeological Materials and Ancient Art, in Legal Problems of 
Museum Administration 241, 248 (ALI-ABA Course of Study) (Mar. 30–Apr. 1, 2005); 
Petr, supra note 69, at 506. 
75 See Jowers, supra note 1, at 168. 
76 See DeAngelis, supra note 74, at 249. 
77 See Sharma, supra note 11, at 762. 
78 See Cohan supra note 22, at 67; DeAngelis, supra note 74, at 247. 
79 See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 402. 
80 See McClain II, 593 F.2d at 670. 
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tural patrimony statutes of a foreign country were too vague to be a 
basis for criminal liability in the United States.81
 In order to pave the way toward a potentially more successful re-
covery action under the NSPA, countries rich in artifacts should ensure 
that their national cultural patrimony laws are clear and comprehensive 
and as easily accessible as other laws.82 Having an accessible, clear and 
unambiguous patrimony law makes it much easier to prove that the 
defendant had knowledge of, and understood, such a law.83
 The NSPA should be amended to include guidelines for what it 
considers to be clear and comprehensive patrimony laws, to assist 
source countries in retrieving their stolen cultural property.84 These 
guidelines would offer source countries a model to follow in crafting 
their patrimony laws, and by following the NSPA’s suggestions, would 
evidence their desire to retrieve their stolen heritage.85 Foreign coun-
tries should not be penalized for not drafting their national patrimony 
laws in compliance with United States’ guidelines, so a source country’s 
failure to do so would not mean that a United States court would refuse 
to recognize the national patrimony law in question.86 The source 
country would still have the opportunity to prove the clarity and acces-
sibility of its law through the use of experts and standard trial tech-
niques.87 Thus, the guidelines would only act as a facilitator, rather 
than a bar to entry.88
 Once a country has crafted its patrimony law in consideration of 
the NSPA’s suggested guidelines, the presumption should then be 
that the defendant had knowledge of, and understood, the law.89 
Thus, after the source country establishes a prima facie case that the 
defendant stole the object from within the country’s borders in viola-
tion of the country’s existing and enforced national patrimony law, 
the defendant would then have the burden of proving that he was un-
aware of the patrimony law and did not know that he was violating it 
by taking the artifact.90 This shift in the burden of proof from the 
source country to the defendant would likely result in an increased 
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. at 670; Cohan, supra note 22, at 66. 
82 See Sharma, supra note 11, at 767. 
83 See McClain II, 593 F.2d at 670 
84 See Sharma, supra note 11, at 756. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 767. 
87 See Petr, supra note 69, at 508–10. 
88 See Sharma, supra note 11, at 756. 
89 But see Cunning, supra note 13, at 483. 
90 But see id. 
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number of suits by the United States on behalf of source countries 
and a greater percentage of stolen cultural property being returned 
to their rightful owners.91
Conclusion 
 The National Stolen Property Act and its enforcement in Schultz 
signals that the United States is committed to assisting source nations 
retrieve their stolen cultural property, and to stemming the ºow of ille-
gal cultural property looting in general. Nevertheless, the requirement 
of a heightened level of proof under the NSPA frustrates enforcement 
of the law, and concomitantly, the attainment of the law's goals of de-
terrence, punishment, and return. Relaxing the knowledge require-
ment of the NSPA would further the twin goals of penalty and return, 
and the United States would be seen as leading the international effort 
in the ªght against disappearing culture. 
                                                                                                                      
91 See DeAngelis, supra note 74, at 248–49. 
